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troves	 of	 sensor	 data,	 unstructured	 video	 surveillance	 feeds,	 and	
many	other	digital	clues	allow	artificial	intelligence	to	make	sense	of	
 













crowds,	 in	 videos,	 in	 photo	 datasets,	 and	 almost	 everywhere	 else.3	





























	 5.	 John	 D.	Woodward,	Biometric	 Scanning,	 Law	 &	 Policy:	 Identifying	 the	 Con-
cerns—Drafting	the	Biometric	Blueprint,	59	U.	PITT.	L.	REV.	97,	134	(1997)	(“Any	high-
integrity	identifier	[such	as	biometric	scanning]	represents	a	threat	to	civil	liberties,	
















cus.7	 Issues	 of	 error,	 bias,	 unfairness,	 and	 opacity	 in	 policing	more	
generally	become	magnified	when	trying	to	design	a	new	surveillance	
system	for	law	enforcement.8		
Understanding	the	 limitations	of	 the	Fourth	Amendment	 in	the	
face	of	new	law	enforcement	technology	is	important	for	three	inde-





lice	 legitimacy	 issues	 around	 error	 rates,	 racial	 bias,	 fairness,	 and	


































ally,	 and	 facial	 recognition	more	 specifically.	 This	 Part	 reveals	 how	












transparency,	 fairness,	 and	privacy	 in	all	 types	of	 facial	 recognition	
technology.	















-new-face-recognition-technology	 [https://perma.cc/WYF4-7XDT];	 Fran	 Spielman,	
ACLU	Sounds	the	Alarm	About	Bill	Allowing	Use	of	Drones	To	Monitor	Protesters,	CHI.	
SUN-TIMES	 (May	 1,	 2018,	 5:17	 PM),	 https://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/aclu	
-sounds-the-alarm-about-bill-allowing-use-of-drones-to-monitor-protesters	[https://	
perma.cc/T64R-SS94];	GARVIE	ET	AL.,	supra	note	3.	

















mouth	and	 the	distances	between	 these	 features,19	 or	 “appearance-
 






LANTIC	 (Apr.	 7,	 2016),	 https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/	
the-underlying-bias-of-facial-recognition-systems/476991	[https://perma.cc/4L5J	
-AXR4].	


















bones	and	 jaw.	These	 features	are	 then	used	to	 look	 for	other	matching	 features.”);	
Mary	Grace	Galterio,	Simi	Angelic	Shavit	&	Thaier	Hayajneh,	A	Review	of	Facial	Biomet-
rics	Security	for	Smart	Devices,	7	MDPI	COMPUTS.	37,	at	3	(2018)	(“Face	metric	uses	the	















tation	 of	 a	 face,	 and	 the	 code	 lines	 up	 the	 same,	 the	 computer	will	
deem	 the	process	a	 “match.”26	These	digitized	 images	are	 stored	 in	
large	datasets	so	that	a	computer	model	can	train	itself	on	what	con-
stitutes	a	match.27	In	many	systems,	returned	matches	involve	more	
than	one	 image	and	may	 involve	as	many	as	 twenty	 to	 fifty	 similar	
faceprints.28	These	face	images	are	provided	in	order	of	the	closeness	








tails	 of	 the	 skin	 as	 captured	 in	 standard	 or	 scanned	digital	 images.	 This	 technique,	
called	Skin	Texture	Analysis,	transforms	lines,	patterns	and	unique	stains	into	a	per-
son’s	skin	in	a	mathematical	space.”).	






the	 face.	The	pattern	 is	calculated	 to	a	degree	of	eigenfaces,	or	eigenvectors,	 that	 is	
determined	by	including	facial	hair	or	the	size	of	facial	features.	Using	different	num-
bers	of	eigenvectors	to	calculate	a	face	can	allow	for	easy	reconstruction.”).	























below,	 one	 use	 is	 face	 surveillance	 which	 involves	 the	 generalized	





Face	 identification	 is	 being	 piloted	 by	 police	 as	 a	 revolutionary	
 























2018,	 6:52	 AM),	 https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-police-go-robocop-with	
-facial-recognition-glasses-1518004353	[https://perma.cc/9J3S-VKFG].	
	 35.	 Joy	Buolamwini,	Response:	Racial	and	Gender	Bias	in	Amazon	Rekognition—








































der,	 ENGADGET	 (June	 5,	 2018),	 https://www.engadget.com/2018/06/05/dhs-facial	




















identification	 card.44	 Either	 the	 face	 image	 from	 your	 passport	
matches	the	digital	photo	just	taken	of	you	standing	in	the	airport	line	
or	not	(there	is	no	searching	of	a	larger	dataset	to	compare	the	images	






















	 46.	 See	 Drew	 Harwell,	 Oregon	 Became	 a	 Testing	 Ground	 for	 Amazon’s	 Facial-
Recognition	 Policing.	 But	What	 if	 Rekognition	 Gets	 It	Wrong?,	WASH.	POST	 (Apr.	 30,	




















faceprint	 and	 a	 second	 digital	 dataset	 to	 match	 those	 faceprints	











means	of	 confirming	 identity	 for	 law	enforcement	 and	non-law	en-









VIDEO	 (May	 30,	 2019,	 5:30	 AM),	 https://www.wsj.com/video/police-unlock-ai	
-potential-to-monitor-surveil-and-solve-crimes/819D5F78-22BC-4A41-9517AE31BE	


































One	 potential	 form	 of	 face	 surveillance	 is	 the	 ability	 to	 search	
stored	video	footage	from	networked	surveillance	cameras.58	Imagine	
the	ability	to	sort	through	stored	digital	video	surveillance	to	identify	


























eras	 with	WatchGuard	 Acquisition,	 BIOMETRIC	UPDATE	 (July	 23,	 2019),	 https://www	
.biometricupdate.com/201907/motorola-could-offer-facial-recognition-with-police	
-body-cameras-with-watchguard-acquisition	[https://perma.cc/6RQG-EHGP].	But	see	
























formation	 displays	 because	 the	 surveillance	 system	 has	matched	 a	
prepopulated	 faceprint	 to	 their	 real-time	 presence.65	 Again,	 in	 this	
type	 of	monitoring	 there	 is	 no	 individualized	 suspicion	 of	 criminal	
wrongdoing.	 Generally,	 the	 justification	 for	 use	 is	 a	 form	 of	 public	











	 64.	 See	Paul	Mozur,	One	Month,	500,000	Face	Scans:	How	China	 Is	Using	A.I.	To	






N.Y.	 TIMES	 (July	 8,	 2018),	 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/business/china	


















photos	 themselves),	 personal	 connections,	 likes,	 interests,	 and	
 
	 66.	 Christina	Zhao,	Jaywalking	in	China:	Facial	Recognition	Surveillance	Will	Soon	




Cup	 and	 Busiest	 International	 Airport	 in	 Japan,	 BIOMETRIC	 UPDATE	 (Nov.	 7,	 2018),	
https://www.biometricupdate.com/201811/nec-facial-biometric-to-be-deployed	
-for-rugby-world-cup-and-busiest-international-airport-in-japan	 [https://perma.cc/	


























activities.71	 For	 example,	 the	 latest	 fabulous	 photo	 of	 your	 family	
beach	vacation	not	only	shows	your	family,	associations,	and	activi-
ties,	but	also	the	day,	time,	and	location	of	the	photo.72	One	of	the	re-
alities	 of	 digital	 photographs	 is	 that,	 by	 design,	 they	 encode	 infor-
mation	about	location,	time,	date,	camera	type,	and	thus	details	about	
where,	when,	and	how	 the	photo	was	 taken.73	A	 composite	of	 loca-


























	 75.	 See	 Jon	Schuppe,	How	Facial	Recognition	Became	a	Routine	Policing	Tool	 in	
America,	NBC	NEWS	 (May	11,	 2019,	 3:19	AM),	 https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us	
-news/how-facial-recognition-became-routine-policing-tool-america-n1004251	
[https://perma.cc/P3A4-KYJR];	Harwell,	supra	note	46.	


















This	 type	 of	 facial	 identification	 process	 is	 used	 by	 the	 FBI	
through	local	state	partners,	and	in	certain	states.	For	example,	in	a	




software	created	by	Amazon	 to	conduct	 investigatory	searches	 in	a	
variety	of	cases.81	Police	 in	Detroit,	Michigan,	have	also	admitted	to	
using	 this	 type	of	 facial	 recognition	matching	 to	 track	down	violent	
suspects.82	
 




	 77.	 Amy	 Harmon,	 As	 Cameras	 Track	 Detroit’s	 Residents,	 a	 Debate	 Ensues	 over	
Racial	 Bias,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	 (July	 8,	 2019),	 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/us/	
detroit-facial-recognition-cameras.html	[https://perma.cc/B5L2-9MS7]	(describing	a	
Detroit	 program	 that	 compares	 faces	 on	 video	 to	 “50	 million	 driver’s	 license	
photographs	and	mug	shots	contained	in	a	Michigan	police	database”);	see	also	Andrew	








	 80.	 O’Neill,	 supra	note	 76	 (“[I]n	1,851	cases	possible	matches	were	returned,	
leading	to	998	arrests.”).	
	 81.	 Harwell,	supra	note	46.	
	 82.	 Harmon,	 supra	 note	 77	 (“Facial	 recognition,	 the	 Detroit	 police	 stress,	 has	
indeed	 helped	 lead	 to	 arrests.	 In	 late	May,	 for	 instance,	 officers	 ran	 a	 video	 image	
through	facial	recognition	after	survivors	of	a	shooting	directed	police	officers	to	a	gas	








































recognition	use	and	allows	deputies	 to	use	 the	 tool	 to	 identify	dead	bodies,	uncon-
scious	suspects	and	people	who	refused	to	give	their	name.”).	
	 86.	 Hill,	supra	note	68;	Ina	Fried,	Clearview	Brings	Privacy	Concerns	from	Facial	





























against	 stored	video	surveillance	 from	a	network	of	 city	 cameras.90	
The	same	matching	technology	can	be	used	to	search	months	of	stored	
surveillance	footage,	networks	of	video	feeds,	or	growing	image	data-






-web	 [https://perma.cc/7VTF-KS66];	 Gisela	 Perez	 &	 Hilary	 Cook,	 Google,	 YouTube,	
Venmo	and	LinkedIn	Send	Cease-and-Desist	Letters	to	Facial	Recognition	App	that	Helps	
Law	 Enforcement,	 CBS	NEWS	 (Feb.	 5,	 2020,	 6:15	 AM),	 https://www.cbsnews.com/	
news/clearview-ai-google-youtube-send-cease-and-desist-letter-to-facial	
-recognition-app	[https://perma.cc/UE64-UZBA];	 Jon	Porter,	Facebook	and	LinkedIn	
Are	 Latest	 to	 Demand	 Clearview	 Stop	 Scraping	 Images	 for	 Facial	 Recognition	 Tech,	























cess	 in	both	but	with	a	particularized	 justification	 for	 face	 tracking	
(i.e.,	looking	for	one	particular	face,	not	identifying	all	faces).	But,	as	









Metropolitan	Police	 rolled	 out	 a	 facial	 recognition	 surveillance	 tool	
that	seeks	to	match	faces	with	a	stored	“watch	list.”97	Of	course,	in	or-
der	to	be	able	to	track	that	one	target,	surveillance	cameras	with	the	





























ogy.98	Police	access	 to	 this	dataset	 (via	 informal	 request,	 subpoena,	
warrant,	or	purchase)	can	help	identify	suspects,	groups,	and	associ-

























	 101.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Joseph	Goldstein	&	 J.	 David	Goodman,	Seeking	 Clues	 to	 Gangs	 and	
Crime,	Detectives	Monitor	Internet	Rap	Videos,	N.Y.	TIMES	(Jan.	7,	2014),	https://www	
.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/nyregion/seeking-clues-to-gangs-and-crime-detectives	
-monitor-internet-rap-videos.html	 [https://perma.cc/E2FC-XYN9]	 (describing	 how	
police	and	prosecutors	 listen	 to	 local	 rap	videos	 to	understand	recent	 crimes);	Ben	
Austen,	Public	Enemies:	Social	Media	Is	Fueling	Gang	Wars	in	Chicago,	WIRED	(Sept.	17,	














sponse,	 not	 their	 investigation.105	 The	 limitations	 here	 involve	 the	
non-law	enforcement	purpose	for	which	the	face	surveillance	or	face	
recognition	technology	is	used.	
These	 non-law	 enforcement	 uses	 seemingly	 avoid	 some	 of	 the	
problems	of	general	face	surveillance	or	investigatory	face	tracking,	











	 103.	 See	 Jon	Schuppe,	Secret	Service	Tests	Facial	Recognition	Surveillance	System	
Outside	White	House,	NBC	NEWS	(Dec.	4,	2018,	11:43	AM),	https://www.nbcnews.com/	
news/us-news/secret-service-tests-facial-recognition-surveillance-system-outside	
-white-house-n943536	 [https://perma.cc/965K-DA4B]	 (describing	 the	 Secret	 Ser-
vice’s	efforts	to	identify	persons	of	interest	outside	the	White	House	compound	quickly	
using	facial	recognition).	




Facial	 Recognition—and	Won,	 FAST	CO.	 (Nov.	 22,	 2019),	 https://www.fastcompany	
.com/90431686/our-landlord-wants-to-install-facial-recognition-in-our-homes-but	
-were-fighting-back	[https://perma.cc/ZV48-864C]	(interviewing	residents	of	Atlan-
tic	 Towers);	 Lola	 Fadulu,	 Facial	 Recognition	 Technology	 in	 Public	 Housing	 Prompts	





cial	 Recognition,	 NPR	 (July	 8,	 2019,	 4:45	 PM),	 https://www.npr.org/2019/07/08/	
739643786/ice-turned-to-dmv-drivers-license-databases-for-help-with-facial	






The	 next	 Part	 addresses	 the	 privacy-invading	 powers	 of	 facial	
recognition	surveillance	technology	and	how	the	Fourth	Amendment	
might	 act	 as	 a	 constitutional	 check	 on	 growing	 police	 surveillance	
power.	Later,	Part	 III	will	 tackle	 the	equally	 fundamental	questions	




How	 does	 the	 Fourth	 Amendment	 fit	 into	 the	 puzzle	 of	 facial	
recognition	 technology?	 There	 is	 not	 an	 easy	 answer	 because	 the	
Fourth	Amendment	has	largely	ignored	surveillance	techniques	that	
police	 use	 early	 in	 an	 investigation106	 and	 failed	 to	 regulate	 infor-
mation	seemingly	exposed	to	the	public.107	But	a	new	understanding	
of	 policing	 as	more	 programmatic	 and	 systemic	 has	 shifted	 recent	
thinking	about	this	traditional	view,108	and	powerful	new	surveillance	





















STAN.	L.	REV.	 1039,	 1041–42	 (2016)	 (“While	 our	 Fourth	 Amendment	 framework	 is	


















privacy,	 the	 government	 action	would	be	 a	 “search,”	 and	without	 a	
warrant	or	exception	to	the	warrant	requirement,	the	search	would	
be	deemed	unconstitutional.111	While	 strange	 to	 think	 about	 today,	
the	facts	of	Katz	also	involved	new	technology,	although	in	1967	that	




























































	 116.	 See	 Clapper	 v.	 Amnesty	 Int’l	 USA,	 568	 U.S.	 398,	 411–14	 (2013)	 (denying	




















ruling	 in	Riley	 v.	 California,120	 legal	 commentators	 have	 recognized	
that	when	it	comes	to	new	digital	surveillance	technologies,	“digital	is	

























Data,	48	TEX.	TECH	L.	REV.	1,	10	 (2015)	 (“[C]omputer	 technologies	can	call	 for	com-
puter-specific	rules.”);	see	also	Jennifer	Stisa	Granick,	SCOTUS	&	Cell	Phone	Searches:	




	 123.	 Andrew	Guthrie	Ferguson,	Future-Proofing	 the	Fourth	Amendment,	HARV.	L.	

















the	 tracking	device	with	 the	 intent	 to	gain	 information	was	a	 “tres-
pass”	that	violated	the	constitutional	rights	of	the	driver.125	More	im-
portantly	 for	our	analytical	purposes,	 five	 Justices	 concurred	 in	 the	
outcome,	 reasoning	 that	 long-term	GPS	 location	 tracking	 violates	 a	
reasonable	expectation	of	privacy	in	most	cases.126	These	concurring	
Justices	were	 concerned	with	 the	 private	 details	 revealed	 by	 long-
term	tracking	in	terms	of	habits,	interests,	associations,	and	the	free-
dom	to	move	without	government	monitoring.127	In	two	overlapping	
concurring	opinions,	 the	 Supreme	Court	drew	a	 line	 at	 the	 govern-
ment’s	ability	to	monitor	individuals	in	public	for	weeks	at	a	time.	This	
understanding	 about	 locational	 privacy	 in	 public	was	 reaffirmed	 in	
Carpenter	v.	United	States.128	
In	Carpenter,	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	police	typically	need	a	
probable	 cause	 warrant	 to	 acquire	 digital	 cell-site	 location	 infor-






















































































not	 traditionally	acknowledged	 in	Fourth	Amendment	 cases.145	The	
Court	is	not	just	talking	about	a	particular	defendant’s	rights	vis	a	vis	




proofing”	 principles,	which	 are	 helpful	 to	 analyze	 new	 surveillance	
technologies.148	Some	of	these	principles	are	decidedly	new,	and	some	
can	trace	their	roots	back	to	first	principles,	but	combined,	these	prin-










































automobiles	 in	ways	 that	would	simply	be	 impossibly	difficult	with	
human	power.155	In	this	way,	the	Court	has	been	conscious	of	future-




to	 maintain	 a	 balance	 between	 growing	 government	 power	 and	
shrinking	 personal	 liberty,159	 recognizing	 that	 Fourth	 Amendment	
principles	are	 threatened	by	new	surveillance	 technologies	 in	ways	




	 153.	 Carpenter	 v.	United	 States,	 138	 S.	 Ct.	 2206,	 2210–14	 (2018)	 (“[T]here	 is	 a	
world	of	difference	between	the	 limited	types	of	personal	 information	addressed	 in	





































gies	 like	 facial	 recognition.	 The	 next	 few	 Subsections	 examine	 the	
principles	underlying	the	Court’s	recent	decisions	looking	at	the	con-
cerns	with	data	aggregation,	data	permanence,	long-term	tracking,	ar-









consequences	of	 large-scale	public	data	collection	on	 individual	 lib-
erty.166	 The	 principle	 was	 reaffirmed	 in	 Carpenter	 when	 the	 Court	
 
preservation	 of	 that	 degree	 of	 privacy	 against	 government	 that	 existed	 when	 the	
Fourth	Amendment	was	adopted.’”	(quoting	Kyllo,	533	U.S.	at	34)).	




















Riley	 with	 private	 smartphone	 data,	 when	 Chief	 Justice	 Roberts	
acknowledged	how	the	sum	of	data	collection	can	reveal	more	than	




















































This	 retrospective	 power	 of	 collected	 data	 points	 offers	 guidance	
about	the	creation	of	any	digital	system	that	collects	personal	infor-







The	 Supreme	 Court	 in	 Jones	 and	Carpenter	 was	 explicitly	 con-
cerned	about	the	locational	tracking	capabilities	of	new	surveillance	
technologies.	Jones	was	literally	a	case	about	GPS	tracking176	and	Car-


























crete	harm	of	 revealing	 locational	data	and	 the	personal	 inferences	
derived	 from	 that	 information.179	 Similarly,	 Chief	 Justice	Roberts	 in	





threatened	 by	 tracking	 technologies.183	 Similarly,	 the	 intellectual	
tracking	of	ideas—as	made	manifest	by	the	informational	choices	in	
our	 smartphone—also	 deserves	 protection	 under	Riley.184	 As	 facial	




trary	police	actions.	 In	Carpenter,	Chief	 Justice	Roberts	 stated	quite	
 
	 179.	 Id.	(“I	would	ask	whether	people	reasonably	expect	that	their	movements	will	
be	 recorded	and	aggregated	 in	a	manner	 that	enables	 the	government	 to	ascertain,	
more	or	less	at	will,	their	political	and	religious	beliefs,	sexual	habits,	and	so	on.”);	id.	
at	430	(Alito,	J.,	concurring)	(“[S]ociety’s	expectation	has	been	that	law	enforcement	
agents	 and	 others	would	 not—and	 indeed,	 in	 the	main,	 simply	 could	 not—secretly	







movements	 through	 the	 record	 of	 his	 cell	 phone	 signals.	 Such	 tracking	 partakes	 of	
























































	 189.	 United	States	v.	 Jones,	565	U.S.	400,	416–17	(2012)	(Sotomayor,	 J.,	concur-
ring)	(emphasis	added).	
	 190.	 Carpenter,	138	S.	Ct.	at	2213–14	(emphasis	added).	

















Finally,	 in	 both	 Carpenter	 and	 Jones,	 the	 Court	 addressed	 the	
Fourth	Amendment’s	foundational	role	in	restricting	invasive	police	
surveillance.198	 In	Carpenter	 the	 Court	 stated,	 “a	 central	 aim	 of	 the	
Framers	was	‘to	place	obstacles	in	the	way	of	a	too	permeating	police	
surveillance.’”199	 In	 Jones,	 Justice	Sotomayor	made	an	even	more	di-
rect	 reference	 to	 overbroad	 police	 power,	 recognizing	 “the	 Fourth	
Amendment’s	 goal	 to	 .	.	.	 prevent	 ‘a	 too	 permeating	 police	 surveil-
lance.”200	
Admittedly,	 the	 “too	 permeating”	 language	 is	 both	 vague	 and	
















	 199.	 Carpenter	 v.	 United	 States,	 138	 S.	 Ct.	 2206,	 2214	 (2018)	 (quoting	 United	
States	v.	Di	Re,	332	U.S.	581,	595	(1948)).	





Framers’	 goals	 for	 the	 Fourth	 Amendment	 with	 colonial	 conceptions	 of	 privacy	 as	










vacy-invading	 surveillance	 technologies	 will	 require	 greater	 scru-
tiny.203	 In	 addition,	 the	 term	 reflects	 a	 long-standing	 constitutional	
concern	with	growing	surveillance	capacities,	which	 links	back	 to	a	




cerns	 about	 scope	and	 scale,	 and	 the	 larger	Carpenter	 emphasis	on	


























ment	 Jurisprudence,	 14	 I/S:	 J.L.	&	POL’Y	 INFO.	SOC’Y	 109,	131	 (2017)	 (“The	Carpenter	



























veillance	 technology	 available	 to	 police.	 As	 will	 be	 observed,	 the	




























party	 records	 image	 set.209	 As	 an	 example:	 imagine	 police	 wish	 to	
identify	everyone	walking	on	a	public	street	or	appearing	in	an	image	
on	 a	 third-party	 social	 network,	 like	 Facebook,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	
gathering	 information	 (not	 criminal	 investigation).	Applying	 the	 fu-
ture-proofing	principles	articulated	in	Part	II.B	to	the	problem	of	face	
surveillance,	all	of	the	principles	point	to	this	type	of	generalized	sur-
veillance	 (identifying	 everyone,	 everywhere,	 for	 all	 time)	 being	
deemed	a	search	for	Fourth	Amendment	purposes.	









recognition	 software.211	 The	 combination	 of	 facial	 recognition	 soft-
ware	with	the	scope	and	scale	of	digital	networks	create	a	new	scheme	
just	too	different	to	equate	to	older	systems.212	In	terms	of	scope,	gen-










age	 carefully	 categorized	 and	 documented	 .	.	.	.	 But	 improvements	 to	
technology	.	.	.	are	poised	to	change	that,	ensuring	that	every	second	of	foot-
age	can	be	analyzed.	
Niraj	 Chokshi,	How	 Surveillance	 Cameras	 Could	 Be	Weaponized	with	 A.I.,	 N.Y.	TIMES	
(June	 13,	 2019),	 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/13/us/aclu-surveillance	
-artificial-intelligence.html	[https://perma.cc/EL49-3YAD];	see	also	Complaint	at	4–5,	
ACLU	v.	U.S.	Dep’t	of	 Just.,	No.	1:19-CV-12242	(D.	Mass.	Oct.	31,	2019)	 (“[Biometric	










spaces	 or	 the	 extensive	 repositories	 of	 images	 in	 third-party	 data-
bases	 provide	 a	 vast	 search	 field	 for	 potential	matches.215	 Months’	
worth	of	stored	video	footage	from	surveillance	cameras,	or	a	data-




	 213.	 See	Randy	E.	Barnett,	The	NSA’s	Surveillance	 Is	Unconstitutional,	WALL	ST.	J.	
(July	11,	2013,	6:44	PM),	https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323823	











perma.cc/XJ6V-JEG3]	 (suggesting	 that	 the	 database	would	 contain	 “photographs	 of	
everyone	in	the	country	with	a	driver’s	license	or	other	state-issued	photo	ID”),	with	
VANESSA	M.	PEREZ,	PROJECT	VOTE,	AMERICANS	WITH	PHOTO	 ID:	A	BREAKDOWN	 OF	DEMO-





GOOGLE:	 KEYWORD	 (May	 27,	 2016),	 https://blog.google/products/photos/google	
-photos-one-year-200-million	 [https://perma.cc/5N7S-UNCU]	 (disclosing	 that	users	
of	one	phone	application	captured	24	billion	self-taken	photos	of	themselves	in	one	
year).	
	 216.	 See	 FACEBOOK	 INV.	 RELS.,	 FACEBOOK	 Q2	 2020	 RESULTS	 3	 (2020),	 https://	
s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc.financials/2020/q2/02-2020-FB-Earnings	
-Presentation.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/F8N9-KYZ4]	 (disclosing	 that	 Facebook	 has	 2.7	
billion	monthly	active	users	worldwide	and	256	million	such	users	in	the	United	States	
and	 Canada);	 FACEBOOK,	 ERICSSON	 &	 QUALCOMM,	 A	 FOCUS	 ON	 EFFICIENCY	 6	 (2013)	
[https://web.archive.org/web/20130919062717/https://fbcdn-dragon-a.akamaihd	
.net/hphotos-ak-prn1/851575_520797877991079_393255490_n.pdf]	(reporting	fig-









veillance	 from	 the	 analog	 tradition	 of	 officers	 taking	photos	 on	 the	




ing	 system	would	constitute	a	Fourth	Amendment	 search,	 although	
the	analysis	for	stored	footage	and	real-time	images	differs	slightly.	
a. Face	Surveillance:	Stored	Footage	
The	 power	 of	 face	 surveillance	 is	 that	 it	 allows	 police	 to	 scan	
through	stored	footage	and	identify	individuals	by	their	face,	aggre-
gate	 their	movements,	 interests,	 and	 patterns,	 and	 store	 and	 study	








































lance	under	 traditional	Fourth	Amendment	 law,225	one	can	 imagine	
that	a	surveillance	system	that	 identified	and	tracked	everyone	in	a	
city	environment	would	be	challenged	under	§	1983	civil	rights	law	as	







































































.cc/JBG9-2EXE]	 (reporting	 the	 noticing	 of	 Virginia	 law	 enforcement	 agencies	 that	
“‘passive’	 use	 of	 automated	 license	 plate	 readers”	 used	 to	 “collect	 data	 on	 people’s	
whereabouts	without	it	being	related	to	a	specific	criminal	investigation”	is	illegal).	
	 233.	 See	supra	Part	II.B.	



























picion	 simply	 for	 monitoring	 purposes.239	 First,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
images	are	held	by	third	parties	does	not	change	the	Fourth	Amend-
ment	analysis.240	The	Supreme	Court	in	Carpenter	held	that	the	Fourth	







generally	 thought	 to	 be	 publicly	 shared	 information.244	 All	 of	 the	
 
	 236.	 Carpenter,	138	S.	Ct.	at	2222–23	(“Even	though	the	Government	will	generally	























































	 247.	 See	Riley	v.	California,	573	U.S.	373,	395	(2014)	(“[M]any	of	 the	more	than	
90%	of	American	adults	who	own	a	cell	phone	keep	on	their	person	a	digital	record	of	
nearly	every	aspect	of	their	lives—from	the	mundane	to	the	intimate.	.	.	.	Allowing	the	
























proving	 the	 Fourth	 Amendment	 harm	 would	 be	 easier.	 A	 plaintiff	
could	argue	that	the	search	was	conducted,	even	if	defining	the	indi-
vidual	Fourth	Amendment	harm	remains	difficult.		











was	 in	 fact	 the	 facial	 recognition	 system	 which	 identified	 the	 defendant.	 See	 Ro-
zenshtein,	 supra	 note	249,	 at	156	 (highlighting	 the	difficulty	 targets	of	 surveillance	
might	have	in	proving	they	were	actually	surveilled).	
	 251.	 See	Clapper,	568	U.S.	at	409–11.	

































taken	 during	 investigations).259	 Another	 consists	 of	 larger	
 
















controls	over	 this	 surveillance	 tactic	are	often	police	departments’	 individual	 social	
media	policies	and	platform	restrictions	.	.	.	.”);	see	also	State	Social	Media	Privacy	Laws,	





















photos,	 that	 include	a	 large	majority	of	 the	population.260	While	the	
two	datasets	raise	different	privacy	concerns	because	of	their	respec-














pervasive	 surveillance.	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 when	 using	 already-
compiled	police-generated	photographs	(as	opposed	to	DMV	photos);	

























































































































take	mere	 seconds.281	Riley’s	 “quantitative”	 and	 “qualitative”	 differ-
ences	of	digital	 technology	 is	made	even	more	obvious	 in	 the	 facial	





















trackable	 because	 of	 the	 identifying	 nature	 of	 their	 face.	 The	 data-





	 281.	 Hill,	 supra	 note	 68	 (reporting	 that	 a	 facial	 recognition	 program	 scanning	
against	social	media	data	“was	‘able	to	identify	a	suspect	in	a	matter	of	seconds’”).	
	 282.	 Riley,	573	U.S.	at	393–94	(“The	sum	of	an	individual’s	private	life	can	be	re-































sity	 of	 surveillance	 cameras	 and	 networks.290	 In	 some	 cities,	 there	
 
	 286.	 See	Jones,	565	U.S.	at	415	(Sotomayor,	J.,	concurring)	(“The	government	can	
store	such	records	and	efficiently	mine	them	for	 information	years	 into	 the	 future.”	
(citing	United	States	v.	Pineda-Moreno,	617	F.3d	1120,	1124	(9th	Cir.	2010)	(Kozinski,	
C.J.,	dissenting)	(mem.))).	
	 287.	 In	 addition	 to	 Justice	 Sotomayor’s	 elucidation	on	 the	personal	 information	







sophisticated	systems	 that	are	already	 in	use	or	 in	development.’”	 (quoting	Kyllo	v.	




















































	 295.	 See	Ava	Kofman,	Real-Time	 Face	 Recognition	 Threatens	 to	 Turn	 Cops’	 Body	




















































	 305.	 See	United	States	v.	 Jones,	565	U.S.	400,	416	(2012)	(Sotomayor,	 J.,	concur-
ring)	(“Awareness	that	the	government	may	be	watching	chills	associational	and	ex-
pressive	freedoms.	And	the	government’s	unrestrained	power	to	assemble	data	that	
reveal	 private	 aspects	 of	 identity	 is	 susceptible	 to	 abuse.”);	 Mozur,	 supra	 note	 65	
(“China	is	reversing	the	commonly	held	vision	of	technology	as	a	great	democratizer,	







ing	 problems	 may	 forestall	 any	 actual	 Fourth	 Amendment	 litiga-





billions	 and	 billions	 of	 images	 and	 videos.308	 Police	 acquisition	 of	
 
	 306.	 As	 a	 parallel,	 this	 type	 of	 investigative	 surveillance	 parallels	 police	 use	 of	







SERV.	 (May	 3,	 2016),	 https://cnsmaryland.org/interactives/spring-2016/maryland	



















currently.”).	 The	 rationale	 is	much	 the	 same	 as	 it	might	 be	 for	 a	 facial	 recognition	
search:	 in	order	 to	 find	 the	 suspect’s	phone,	 the	Stingray	device	 searches	 all	 of	 the	
other	signals	in	the	area,	increasing	the	attendant	privacy	harms.	See	supra	notes	300–











some	 subset	 of	 these	 images	 against	 which	 to	 run	 face	 tracking	























TIME	 (Oct.	 6,	 2015,	 8:00	 AM),	 https://time.com/4060078/instagram-5th-birthday	





	 312.	 See	 supra	 note	 243	 and	 accompanying	 text;	 cf.	 United	 States	 v.	 Pineda-
Moreno,	617	F.3d	1120,	1124	(9th	Cir.	2010)	(Kozinski,	C.J.,	dissenting)	(mem.)	(“[GPS	
trackers]	create	a	permanent	electronic	record	that	can	be	compared,	contrasted	and	
coordinated	 to	 deduce	 all	manner	 of	 private	 information	 about	 individuals.”),	 cert.	
granted,	vacated,	remanded	for	consideration	in	light	of	United	States	v.	Jones,	565	U.S.	
1189	(2012),	aff’d	on	remand,	688	F.3d	1087	(9th	Cir.	2012).	
	 313.	 In	Riley,	 the	Court	was	 concerned	 less	with	 the	 tracking	data	 emitted	by	a	





mate.	.	.	.	 There	 are	 apps	 for	Democratic	Party	news	 and	Republican	Party	
news;	 apps	 for	 alcohol,	 drug,	 and	 gambling	 addictions;	 apps	 for	 sharing	
prayer	requests;	apps	for	tracking	pregnancy	symptoms;	apps	for	planning	
































-10-00871.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/GV47-HURU]	 (“Many	 [participants	 in	 a	 study]	
thought	that	‘Instagram	portrays	what	they	(account	holders)	want	their	personality	to	























pose,	 either	 in	 the	 form	 of	 surveillance	 or	 investigation.	 But	 facial	
recognition	 technology	may	 also	 be	 used	 for	 non-law	 enforcement	
purposes	in	a	host	of	situations	requiring	proof	of	 identity.	 In	these	




The	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 had	 an	 inconsistent	 relationship	 with	





sis.325	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 purpose	 does	 matter	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
programmatic	decisions.	In	Edmond,	the	Court	held	that	because	the	



















ring]	 with	 the	 Court’s	 acknowledgment	 just	 two	 sentences	 later	 that	 an	 officer’s	
























the	purpose	 issue.	 If	 police	wish	 to	use	 face	 surveillance	 for	public	
safety	monitoring	(e.g.,	at	protests,	events,	special	secure	places),	they	
could	 argue	 that	 their	 purpose	 was	 not	 for	 ordinary	 law	
 
	 326.	 See	City	of	Indianapolis	v.	Edmond,	531	U.S.	32,	44	(2000)	(“The	primary	pur-













	 329.	 See	Ric	 Simmons,	 The	 Mirage	 of	 Use	 Restrictions,	 96	 N.C.	L.	REV.	 133,	 155	
















cate	a	 lost	child,	 they	could	argue	 for	an	emergency	exception333	or	
that	 there	 was	 an	 “opt-in”	 choice	 (almost	 like	 consent)	 to	 put	 the	
child’s	 face	 in	the	matching	system.334	Thus,	purpose	could	create	a	
workaround	for	police	who	wish	to	use	 facial	recognition	technolo-















	 333.	 See,	e.g.,	Kendall	v.	Olsen,	727	F.	App’x	970,	973	(10th	Cir.)	 (holding	 that	a	
missing	 child	 justified	 a	warrantless	 search	 on	 exigency	 grounds);	 United	 States	 v.	
Gilliam,	842	F.3d	801,	804	(2d	Cir.	2016)	(holding	that	exigency	justified	the	warrant-
less	GPS	tracking	of	a	suspect	to	locate	a	kidnapped	minor).	

















	 337.	 See	Geoffrey	A.	 Fowler,	Why	Airport	 Facial	 Recognition	Raises	 Privacy	 Con-



















warrant,341	but	more	 limited	types	of	 face	 identification	using	data-
bases	of	stored	mugshots	or	DMV	photographs	might	not.342	A	contin-
uum	exists	between	permitting	some	types	of	police	surveillance	and	



















nition	 in	 Schools,	 WIRED	 (Oct.	 17,	 2019,	 6:00	 AM),	 https://www.wired.com/story/	
delicate-ethics-facial-recognition-schools	 [https://perma.cc/733Q-YCS9]	 (reporting	





	 343.	 United	States	v.	 Jones,	565	U.S.	400,	416–17	(2012)	(Sotomayor,	 J.,	concur-
ring)	(quoting	United	States	v.	Di	Re,	332	U.S.	281,	595	(1948)).	
	 344.	 See	Geoffrey	Fowler,	Black	Lives	Matter	Could	Change	Facial	Recognition	For-
























nificant	 degree).	 Applying	 those	 findings	 to	 Fourth	Amendment	 issues,	 one	 scholar	
suggested	that:	
[p]olice/citizen	encounters	involving	searches	and	seizures	are	just	the	kind	











(June	 12,	 2020),	 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd	
-abolish-defund-police.html	 [https://perma.cc/DBQ6-REDB];	 Annie	 Lowrey,	Defund	




-police-these-cities-offer-ideas-n1229266	 [https://perma.cc/VM4D-2WMC];	 Alex	 S.	



































































as	 biased	 as	 any	 other	 human	 enterprise.353	 Further,	 without	
 
	 350.	 See,	e.g.,	ACM	FAccT,	ASS’N	FOR	COMPUTING	MACH.	CONF.	ON	FAIRNESS,	ACCOUNTA-
BILITY	 &	 TRANSPARENCY,	 https://facctconference.org/index.html	 [https://perma.cc/	
5WLQ-DS86]	(“Although	these	[algorithmic]	systems	may	bring	myriad	benefits,	they	
also	 contain	 inherent	 risks,	 such	 as	 codifying	 and	 entrenching	 biases;	 reducing	 ac-
countability,	and	hindering	due	process;	they	also	increase	the	information	asymmetry	
between	 individuals	whose	data	 feed	 into	 these	systems	and	big	players	capable	of	
inferring	potentially	relevant	information.	ACM	FAccT	is	an	interdisciplinary	confer-
ence	dedicated	to	bringing	together	a	diverse	community	of	scholars	from	computer	
science,	 law,	 social	 sciences,	 and	humanities	 to	 investigate	and	 tackle	 issues	 in	 this	
emerging	area.”);	Solon	Barocas	&	Andrew	D.	Selbst,	Big	Data’s	Disparate	Impact,	104	












DATA	 INCREASES	 INEQUALITY	 AND	THREATENS	DEMOCRACY	 (2016)	 (discussing	 how	 bias	






















lance	matches.356	 Early	 testing	 of	 facial	 recognition	 has	 had	 a	 poor	
















































sic	 factors,	 including	the	way	 in	which	photos	are	captured	and	the	
complexities	 of	 facial	 features	 and	 human	 movement.361	 This	 er-




lead	 to	 investigations,	 arrests,	 and	prosecution.	The	danger	of	 false	
positive	hits	leads	to	false	arrests,363	and	the	consequence	for	such	a	
false	match	means	 a	 coercive	 and	 potentially	 dangerous	 encounter	






FECTS	 2–3	 (2019),	 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8280.pdf	
[https://perma.cc/4VEW-SD7F];	 see	 also	 Sophie	 Bushwick,	How	NIST	 Tested	 Facial	


















WIRED	 (July	 22,	 2019,	 7:00	 AM),	 https://www.wired.com/story/best-algorithms	

































Recognition	 Software	 Involved	 in	 Bogus	 Arrest	 Is	 Wrong	 ‘96	 Percent	 of	 the	 Time,’	
TECHDIRT	 (July	 2,	 2020,	 3:30	 AM),	 https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200629/	
17423944814/detroit-police-chief-says-facial-recognition-software-involved-bogus	
-arrest-is-wrong-96-percent-time.shtml	 [https://perma.cc/9FC8-H2QU];	 see	 also	
Joy	Buolamwini,	Artificial	 Intelligence	 Has	 a	 Problem	 with	 Gender	 and	 Racial	 Bias.	
Here’s	 How	 to	 Solve	 It,	 TIME	 (Feb.	 7,	 2019,	 7:00	 AM),	 http://time.com/5520558/	
artificial-intelligence-racial-gender-bias	[https://perma.cc/9USJ-K94C]	(“[F]ailed	ma-
chine	 learning	systems	 .	.	.	 amplify,	 rather	 than	rectify,	 sexist	hiring	practices,	 racist	








the	humans	who	create	 the	algorithms	are	hidden	 from	view.”);	Buolamwini,	 supra	
note	 352	 (discussing	 how	 algorithmic	 bias	 amplifies	 discrimination);	 Sahil	 Chinoy,	












poor	 job	 of	 identifying	 faces	 of	 other	 races,368	 especially	 black	
















It’s	 Time	 to	 Face	 the	 Truth,	 MEDIUM	 (July	 4,	 2018),	 https://medium.com/@Joy	
.Buolamwini/when-ai-fails-on-oprah-serena-williams-and-michelle-obama-its-time	
-to-face-truth-bf7c2c8a4119	 [https://perma.cc/AQC8-PQES]	 (“Error	 rates	 were	 as	
high	as	35%	for	darker-skinned	women	.	.	.	.”);	Joy	Buolamwini	&	Timnit	Gebru,	Gender	
Shades:	 Intersectional	 Accuracy	 Disparities	 in	 Commercial	 Gender	 Classification,	 81	
PROC.	 MACH.	 LEARNING	 RSCH.	 1,	 11	 (2018),	 http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/	




Acquisition:	 An	 Evaluation	 of	 Eleven	 Commercial	 Systems,	 INST.	ELEC.	&	ELEC.	ENG’RS	
TRANSACTIONS	 ON	BIOMETRICS,	BEHAV.	&	 IDENTITY	 SCI.	 (Feb.	 2019),	 https://ieeexplore	














der	 nonconforming	 people,	 nonbinary	 people,	 agender	 people,	 and/or	 transgender	
people),	 our	 2018	Gender	 Shades	 audit	 showed	women	with	 skin	 types	 associated	
with	blackness	had	error	rates	as	high	as	47%.	In	the	same	study	for	men	with	skin-
types	 perceived	 as	white,	 error	 rates	were	 no	more	 than	 .08%	 in	 aggregate.”);	 Ali	
Alkhatib	et	al.,	On	Recent	Research	Auditing	Commercial	Facial	Analysis	Technology,	ME-












crimination	 (based	 on	 a	 particular	 characteristic),	 or	 “fairness”	 as	
choosing	equally	among	groups,	or	“fairness”	as	preferring	false	posi-
tives	to	false	negatives,	or	“fairness”	as	random	selection,	or	a	host	of	


















	 376.	 Ziyuan	Zhong,	A	Tutorial	on	Fairness	 in	Machine	Learning,	MEDIUM	 (Oct.	21,	
2018),	https://towardsdatascience.com/a-tutorial-on-fairness-in-machine-learning	
-3ff8ba1040cb	 [https://perma.cc/HL42-9ZEJ]	 (“[D]efinitions,	 however,	 are	 too	 ab-
stract	for	the	purpose	of	computation.	As	a	result,	there	is	no	consensus	on	the	mathe-
matical	formulations	of	fairness.”).	
	 377.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Andrew	D.	 Selbst,	 danah	 boyd,	 Sorelle	 A.	 Friedler,	 Suresh	 Venka-
































sues	 of	 error,	 bias,	 fairness,	 and	 transparency	 in	 traditional	 Fourth	
Amendment	cases.	Thus,	if	offered	as	a	design	guide	to	computer	en-






































warrant	 that	 intrusion.”386	 In	 subsequent	 cases,	 the	 Court	 has	
acknowledged	 that	 reasonable	 suspicion	 can	 involve	 completely	
 
	 382.	 See,	e.g.,	Herring	v.	United	States,	555	U.S.	135,	144	(2009)	(“To	trigger	the	




















































































isting	 percentages	 many	 individuals	 could	 be	 incorrectly	 stopped	
based	on	erroneous	matches.395	If	mapped	to	the	reasonable	suspicion	
standard,	a	facial	recognition	system	could	be	more	wrong	than	right	






arresting	 or	 searching	 individuals.396	 The	 standard	 originates	 from	
the	 text	of	 the	Fourth	Amendment,	but	despite	 this	provenance,	 its	
meaning	has	never	been	established	 in	any	single	definition.397	The	
Supreme	Court	has	articulated	 several	 formulations	over	 the	years,	




































Court	 has	 emphasized	 its	 “practical,	 common-sense”	 application401	
and	specifically	refused	to	offer	any	quantification.402	Generally,	 the	
objective	test	is	whether	a	“man	of	reasonable	caution”	or	“reasonably	





some	 general	 consensus.405	 As	 Professor	 Ric	 Simmons	 has	written,	







































cutors	 and	 law	 enforcement	 point	 to	 numbers	 between	 40%	 and	
51%.”406	The	quantum	of	evidence	is	certainly	greater	than	reasona-






















































missible	 amount	 of	 Fourth	 Amendment	 error	 tolerated	 in	 policing.	
Adding	to	the	calculus	is	the	fact	that	the	Supreme	Court	has	both	nar-














ate	 that	 exclusion	 can	meaningfully	 deter	 it,	 and	 sufficiently	 culpable	 that	
such	deterrence	is	worth	the	price	paid	by	the	justice	system.	As	laid	out	in	


























































error	 and	 its	 negative	 consequences	 for	 individuals.”);	 see	 also	Herring,	 555	U.S.	 at	
155–56	(Ginsburg,	 J.,	dissenting)	(“Inaccuracies	 in	expansive,	 interconnected	collec-
tions	of	electronic	information	raise	grave	concerns	for	individual	liberty.	‘The	offense	
to	the	dignity	of	the	citizen	who	is	arrested,	handcuffed,	and	searched	on	a	public	street	
























































between	 low-income	 Black	 communities	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 larger	White	
community	in	general,	and	corporate	interests	in	particular,	is	the	domestic	colony.	In	
the	context	of	the	domestic	colony,	the	police	are	responsible	for	maintaining	the	co-
















racial	 bias	 is	 largely	 irrelevant	 to	 policing	 decisions	 has	 essentially	



















MENT	 24	 (2016)	 [hereinafter	 DOJ	BALTIMORE	 REPORT],	 https://www.justice.gov/crt/	





























to	 impact	 reasonable	 suspicion	 and	 probable	 cause	 in	 a	 series	 of	
Fourth	 Amendment	 cases.432	 “[H]igh	 crime	 areas,”433	 “drug	 courier	
 
	 430.	 Utah	v.	Strieff,	136	S.	Ct.	2056,	2069	(2016)	(Sotomayor,	J.,	dissenting)	(“[An	
officer’s]	 justification	must	 provide	 specific	 reasons	why	 the	 officer	 suspected	 you	





































































forcement	 Will	 Use	 Tattoo	 Recognition	 Technology,	 ELEC.	 FRONTIER	 FOUND.	 (June	 2,	
2016),	https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/05/5-ways-law-enforcement-will-use	

















case,	 as	 differences	 in	 race,	 class,	 gender,	 and	 place	 have	 impacted	
every	 facet	 of	 the	 policing	 process.444	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 procedural	
 
	 441.	 See	Garvie	&	Frankle,	supra	note	15.		













-how-its-stacked-against-blacks.html	 [https://perma.cc/Z49Q-PHMM]	 (using	 charts	
to	demonstrate	how	blacks	are	discriminated	against	at	nearly	every	level	of	the	crim-
inal	justice	system);	Brad	Heath,	Racial	Gap	in	U.S.	Arrest	Rates:	‘Staggering	Disparity,’	













ment	 perspective,	 “fairness”	 defined	 as	 equal	 treatment	 of	 people,	
groups,	and	places	has	never	been	constitutionally	required.448	
In	 fact,	 explicit	 adoption	 of	 profiling,	 high	 crime	 areas,	 border	















macy	 of	 Police	 Among	 Young	 African-American	 Men,	 92	 MARQ.	L.	REV.	 651,	 657–66	
(2009)	(describing	police	practices	that	can	promote	legitimacy	and	procedural	jus-
tice).	


































For	 purposes	 of	 building	 a	 facial	 recognition	matching	 system,	
the	same	tension	between	ideals	and	application	arises.	The	ideal	of	
fairness,	meaning	applying	the	same	decision-making	rules	to	similar	











to	 say	 about	 unequal	 or	 disparate	 effects	 of	 policing.	 Policing	 re-
sources	historically	are	not	equally	distributed	across	society.458	Po-






































the	 placement	 of	 surveillance	 cameras	 in	 particular	 neighborhoods	
will	not	be	heard.	Complaints	about	the	disproportionate	number	of	







officer	 acted	 the	way	 they	 did.	 Further,	well-documented	 cognitive	






YORKER	 (Aug.	 13,	 2013),	 https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the	
-statistical-debate-behind-the-stop-and-frisk-verdict	 [https://perma.cc/FT7P-QZTZ]	





































very	 transparent	 about	 subjects	 like	 training,	 experiences,	 or	 tac-






































Fourth	 Amendment,	 and	 how	 new	 technologies	 intersect	 with	 the	
Fourth	Amendment	are	all	quite	unclear.	
A	 facial	 recognition	 system	 built	 to	 such	 Fourth	 Amendment	
standards	can	be	a	true	“black	box”	and	still	be	constitutional	under	
this	 thinking.	The	Fourth	Amendment	neither	 requires	police	 to	be	
transparent	nor	asks	for	the	true	underlying	reason	for	the	stop,	as	
long	as	there	is	an	objective	justification.478	So,	 for	example,	a	facial	




limit	 rather	 than	 promote	 information	 availability.	 Cities	 and	 police	 departments	
sometimes	actively	inhibit	the	collection	of	information	about	police	by,	for	example,	
requiring	secrecy	when	 they	settle	civil	 suits	 for	police	misconduct	or	discouraging	
citizens	from	filing	complaints	about	officer	conduct.”).	
	 474.	 See	Barbara	 E.	 Armacost,	Organizational	 Culture	 and	 Police	Misconduct,	 72	
GEO.	WASH.	L.	REV.	453,	533	(2004)	(“[E]fforts	by	outside	agencies	to	collect	and	analyze	
information	 in	a	potentially	adversarial	 framework,	such	as	a	§	14141	 lawsuit,	may	
lead	police	officers	to	be	defensive	and	uncooperative.”).	
	 475.	 See	Harmon,	supra	note	473,	at	1133	(“[S]tates	not	only	do	little	to	encourage	





another	 sense;	 the	 companies	 that	 create	 them	often	 refuse	 to	 divulge	 information	






















Like	 the	 privacy	 problem,	 the	 Fourth	 Amendment	 offers	 little	
comfort	to	some	of	the	longstanding	challenges	to	police	legitimacy.	
The	question	is	why,	and	what	can	be	done	about	it.	






“programmatic”	 may	 also	 be	 different	 for	 the	 Fourth	 Amendment	




These	 two	 insights	 are	 not	 necessarily	 new,	 as	 scholars	 like	




veillance	 like	 facial	 recognition.	 The	 common	 theme	 (like	with	 pri-
vacy)	is	that	the	more	programmatically	designed	and	systematized	a	


















ment	allows	 for	 some	mistakes	on	 the	part	of	government	officials,	
giving	them	‘fair	leeway	for	enforcing	the	law	in	the	community’s	pro-
tection.’”481	The	Supreme	Court	has	forgiven	mistakes	of	 fact482	and	
mistakes	 of	 law.483	 Within	 this	 “human”	 forgiveness,	 the	 Supreme	
Court	emphasizes	the	quickness	required	for	immediate	decisions,	the	
complexity	of	human	behavior	and	observations,	and	the	one-off	na-
ture	of	decision-making.484	 In	addition,	 the	Court	 forgives	error	be-
cause	 Fourth	 Amendment	 law	 can	 be	 technical	 and	 hard	 to	 inter-
pret.485	




preme	 Court	 is	 critical.486	 Dragnet	 sweeps,	 roadblocks,	 and	 other	





















































gation,	 clear	 evidence	 of	 systemic	 police	 error,	 misconduct,	 and	












































































rights,	 it	might	be	 an	 even	 stronger	 case	 to	 say	 that	 a	 system	built	
around	 80%	 error	 violates	 Fourth	 Amendment	 rights.	 Thus,	 civil	
rights	investigations,	civil	rights	lawsuits,	and	empirical	studies	that	
demonstrate	systemic	or	recurring	error	could	be	the	basis	of	finding	










nologies	 like	 facial	 recognition	are	by	design	non-human,	program-
matically	engineered,	and	meant	to	offer	recurring	and	systemic	infor-




























ness	 should	 open	 the	 door	 for	 a	 different	 legal	 analysis.	 A	 litigant	
should	be	able	 to	bring	a	case	showing	 the	design	 flaw	as	a	Fourth	
Amendment	problem	and	escape	the	traditional	arguments	about	low	
standards	of	suspicion,	the	irrelevance	of	error,	or	pretext.	
For	 example,	 if	 the	 face	 identification	 system	 routinely	 fails	 to	
identify	women	of	color	in	comparison	to	white	males,	a	suspect	who	
was	stopped	based	on	a	 face	 identification	match	should	be	able	 to	
challenge	the	stop	on	Fourth	Amendment	grounds	without	being	lim-
ited	 by	 Whren’s	 suggestion	 that	 bias	 is	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 Fourth	
Amendment.504	Or,	if	the	error	rate	were	revealed,	the	suspect	should	
be	able	to	challenge	the	stop	based	on	the	high	error	rate	without	be-















ory	 that	 digital	 systems—like	 facial	 recognition—are	 different	 for	
Fourth	Amendment	purposes	would	need	to	be	adopted	by	the	courts.	






















































The	 justification	 for	 such	 a	 ban	 derives	 in	 large	 part	 from	 the	
Fourth	Amendment	principles	discussed	earlier.	This	 type	of	 suspi-
cionless,	 warrantless,	 mass	 surveillance	 system	 runs	 straight	 into	
Fourth	 Amendment	 concerns508	 and—depending	 on	 the	 scope	 and	













willingness	 to	 use	 surveillance	 technologies	 to	 monitor	 dissenting	


















	 512.	 See	 George	 Joseph,	 Exclusive:	 Feds	 Regularly	 Monitored	 Black	 Lives	 Matter	
Since	Ferguson,	 INTERCEPT	(July	24,	2015,	1:50	PM),	https://theintercept.com/2015/	
07/24/documents-show-department-homeland-security-monitoring-black-lives	









































	 516.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Caroline	 Haskins,	 Oakland	 Becomes	 Third	 U.S.	 City	 To	 Ban	 Facial	





-n1007186	 [https://perma.cc/M7XY-XLU2]	 (May	 22,	 2019,	 2:09	 PM);	 Rachel	Metz,	
California	 Lawmakers	 Ban	 Facial-Recognition	 Software	 from	 Police	 Body	 Cams,	 CNN	








and	 aggregation	 of	 digital	 images	 and	 the	 ease	 of	 automating	 face	
identification,	 a	heightened	 legal	 standard	and	additional	 legal	pro-
cess	 should	 be	 legislatively	 required.	 Second,	 this	 probable	 cause	









simple	 fact	 is	 that	 any	 government-controlled	 database	 can	 be	 ex-
panded	 to	 include	any	number	of	 images	bought,	 scraped	 from	 the	
web,	or	developed	organically.520	



































eras	 could	 be	 uploaded	 to	 see	 if	 a	 face	 identification	match	 occurs	
(with	 all	 the	 images	 permanently	 stored	 for	 future	 searches).524	 A	
probable	cause	warrant	requirement,	while	not	mandated	by	the	cur-
















record	 allowing	 for	 a	measure	 of	 transparency,	 accountability,	 and	
avoidance	of	abuse.528	Probable	cause	warrants	are	not	simply	about	
justifying	an	intrusion	into	personal	privacy	but	also	about	document-








Criminal	 Investigation,	 360	 SCIENCE	 1078	 (2018)	 (discussing	 a	Wiretap	 Act-like	 re-
quirement	 for	genetic	databases);	DAVID	GRAY,	THE	FOURTH	AMENDMENT	 IN	AN	AGE	OF	
SURVEILLANCE	255–57	(2017)	(proposing	a	Wiretap	Act-like	process	for	tracking	tech-















































	 536.	 See,	 e.g.,	Petty,	 supra	note	349;	Devich-Cyril,	 supra	note	5;	Evan	Selinger	&	
Woodrow	Hartzog,	What	Happens	When	Employers	Can	Read	Your	Facial	Expressions?,	
N.Y.	 TIMES	 (Oct.	 17,	 2019),	 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/opinion/facial	
-recognition-ban.html	[https://perma.cc/ZHE7-GB9X];	Luke	Stark,	Facial	Recognition	
Is	 the	Plutonium	of	AI,	XRDS:	CROSSROADS,	Apr.	2019,	at	50,	52–55,	https://xrds.acm	























































provides	 law	enforcement	 access	 to	personal	 communications	on	 a	
showing	of	probable	cause	in	addition	to	a	few	other	requirements.541	
The	Wiretap	Act	is	built	around	several	limitations.	First,	it	is	lim-
ited	 to	 specific	 enumerated	 crimes,	most	 of	which	 are	 serious	 felo-
nies.542	 Second,	 the	 Act	 itself	 has	 four	 requirements:	 (1)	 probable	
cause	that	a	crime	has	been	committed,	(2)	a	minimization	require-
ment	 to	 avoid	 unnecessary	 collection,	 (3)	 a	 declaration	 that	 other	
means	of	investigation	have	been	exhausted,	and	(4)	a	particularized	
statement	 about	 the	 length	 of	 time	 and	 type	 of	 communication	




atively	 easy	 to	 implement	 because	 all	 that	 would	 be	 required	 is	 a	
showing	 of	 probable	 cause	 that	 a	 serious	 felony	 violent	 crime	 had	


































































on	reasonable	 suspicion,546	 one	could	 imagine	 that	 face	verification	





























the	 interests	 of	 the	 government	 are	 the	 strongest,550	 the	 Fourth	
Amendment	has	 little	 purchase,551	 and	 individuals	 are	 already	pre-































































	 557.	 See	U.S.	GOV’T	ACCOUNTABILITY	OFF.,	supra	note	519	(discussing	the	need	 for	

















uals	 from	all	 races,	 genders,	 and	orientations	 in	 the	 creation	of	 the	











development	 of	 face	 surveillance	 technology	 will	 be	 different	 than	























































riously	 the	 privacy	 and	 legitimacy	 concerns	 of	 the	 technology	 that	
might	undermine	it.	
 





















personal,	 and	 corporal.	 Constant	 public	 surveillance	 chills	 associa-
tional	 freedom,	 inhibits	expression,	and	undermines	the	freedom	to	
protest	or	petition	for	redress.570	The	ability	to	carve	out	a	private	life	
independent	 of	 government	 watchers	 is	 fundamental	 to	 modern	
American	 life.571	Finally,	 the	harm	can	be	quite	physical,	 as	 surveil-
lance	can	lead	to	police	contact	and	control.	The	social	control	powers	
of	surveillance	do	not	always	remain	virtual	but	can	have	real	world	





fundamental	 problems	 of	 error,	 bias,	 opacity,	 and	 unfairness.	 The	
framework	set	forth	in	this	Article	offers	a	compromise	that	acknowl-
edges	that	not	all	facial	recognition	technology	is	the	same,	but	that	all	
such	 surveillance	 requires	 oversight	 and	 accountability.	 Legislative	













on	 Facial	 Recognition,	 N.Y.	TIMES	 (Oct.	 31,	 2019),	 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/	
10/31/opinion/facial-recognition-regulation.html	[https://perma.cc/GEL9-YLGH]	
(proposing	a	legislative	solution).		
